To the Battle

The Battle of Hamel : Toward the Battle

1. Why Hamel ?

29 March 1918. View of the Somme Valley. Germans shelling the Somme Valley near Hamel in preparation for a further thrust of 30 March 1918 against the British line there. (The view is eastward from the heights north of the Somme). AWM E04663©

A photograph taken on the rainy day of 30 March 1918, from a position near the Observatory on the Bray-Corbie road, about a mile from Bray. Vaire-sous-Corbie is on the right and Vaux-sur-Somme on the left. Between these villages, in the valley, can be seen several shell bursts, and the smoke of the enemy barrage put down in support of a counter attack at Hamel.. AWM E01945©

From the end of April 1918 with the end of the German spring offensive in the Somme, Le Hamel and its surroundings formed a small west salient in the German line facing the 4th British Army (Rawlinson). A crest surmounted the village on the east and provided an excellent observation of positions held by the Australian Corps north of the river and west almost to Corbie along the river-banks (see map). The village of Le Hamel, was fortified and well defended, and was a key defensive post for the Germans.

The capture of this sector would allow the Australians to get this key German observation post (see section). The defence of Villers-Bretonneux (6 km south) and of the main road to Amiens would be also improved. Moreover, the Allies needed a good base for future operations. So, holding Le Hamel was a very necessary preliminary for any major attack in this sector needing large-scale artillery support. If not, all preparations would be obvious to the Germans and the assault troops would be in sight of the enemy and exposed to flanking fire even before the attack.

Clearly Hamel was the key to taking back the initiative. These are the main reasons why the Australians, under general Monash's command, which had already advanced to Morlancourt north of the Somme (10 June 1918), prepared themselves to do the same south of the river. But Monash had other private reasons too. He had only just taken command of the Australian Corps and was keen to test his new command and prove what the Australians were capable of.

2. The human potential

At the beginning of summer, the total human potential of the Australian Corps was not very high. Even if it was not yet the lethal strain, which would occur in September, an influenza epidemic thinned the ranks. An important decrease in recruitment in Australia added on it. Consequently, losses were not quickly replaced by the enlistment of new men. This way, the five divisions of the Australian Corps only arrived at about 90% of the optimum effective, almost 8,255 infantrymen in each division. On the other hand, these divisions were very experienced and were comprised entirely of volunteers. They were under Australian command for the first time and morale was very high.

English, American and Australian troops lunching in a wood near Corbie the day prior to the battle. AWM E02697©

3 July 1918. English, American and Australian troops lunching in a wood near Corbie the day prior to the battle. AWM E02694©

A 16th Battlion, AIF, sergeant on a bicycle and an American private in perambulator, just before the Hamel offensive (lent by Capt. D.S. Aarons, M.C.) . AWM A00815©

On the whole only 7,500 diggers were disengaged to capture Hamel. The Australian Corps lacked of men and it had to be preserved for larger operations. Therefore, its integrity was not to be menaced by a local action that simply aimed to correct a little part of the front.

For these reasons, General Rawlinson suggested to General Monash that he use some units of the 33rd American Division (national guard) which were then training with the Australians. Major General G.W. Read of the IInd American Corps agreed. Monash obtained the reinforcement of ten companies of the 131st and 132nd American regiments, which represented 2,000 men (for further operation on involved forces see the order of battle). These ten companies would be dispatched by platoons into the Australian battalions in order to be better officered during their first experience of the fire. The doughboys and the diggers were quickly in good terms. Sometimes, the Australians thought their new American comrades a little too expansive and were embarrassed by their officer's speeches.

At the last moment, on the 3rd of July, the news came that because of a misunderstanding, General Pershing, the American army commander-in-chief in France, had not given his direct agreement to the use of American troops. He demanded that the ten companies were not to be involved in the assault and were to be removed from the front. Such an action would interfere a lot with Monash plans. Half of the battalions would have to be reorganized. As an example, the 11th brigade would attack with 2,200 men instead of 3,000. The American soldiers were deeply disappointed. Some stories said that some of them dressed with the Australian uniform in order to fight all the same. Finally, four American companies were allowed to stay because they were already deployed and because it was too late to recall them. Moreover, Monash threatened to cancel the attack if all the American's would leave. With respect to the German soldiers, it was Bavarians, many from the 13th division of the IInd German army under General von der Marwitz's command. Except in some places, they were quiet badly retrenched. Like many German soldiers of these time, they were tired, underfed and victims of influenza. However, their moral was not yet fallen and their combativeness was still strong.

3. Precautions and preparations

The attack plan was chosen on the 21 of June. It was the first operation planned by John Monash as a Corps commander. It was prepared with the extreme thoroughness and carefulness that characterized him. Ten battalions of infantry would attack a front of 7,000 yards and average depth of 2,000 yards.

3 Jul 1918. The Brigade Major of the 4th Brigade Headquarters (HQ), AIF, at Battle Headquarters established in a quarry near Hamelet, issuing instructions to Company officers the day before the battle of Hamel. AWM E02683©

Troops progression, timing, reinforcement and the use of the different weapons were planned in detail. Many successive meetings took place before where the various interested people presented the eventual problems. Therefore, the needed modifications were taken on account. The assault success depended on the respect of the absolute secret during its preparation. Dummy installations were built to mislead the enemy. Ammunitions dumps, guns and the other equipments. Troops did not have to move on daylight. They would reach their starting positions just on time and under a constant fire.

Moreover, the information about the attack were progressively give to the officers, in proportion as it was necessary. The risk that a men captured by the enemy could speak had to be minimized. Still to mislead the enemy, in the same time the 15th brigade would attack Ville-sur-Ancre ten kilometres north of Hamel. These diversion was designed to make the Germans believed that the attack was not only limited to Hamel. So, normally the Germans would not immediately involved reserves and would not organize a local counter-attack.